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A New Approach to Testing Marginal Productivity Theory
* 
 
We address the long standing question of whether production factors are paid their marginal 
products. We propose a new approach that circumvents the need to specify production 
functions and to compare marginal products to factor payments. Our approach is based on a 
simple equation that directly relates firms’ profits to discrepancies between factor payments 
and marginal products. Our empirical application using data on manufacturing firms suggests 
that capital receives more than its marginal product, intermediate inputs receive less, and 
labor receives about its marginal product. Although there are differences with respect to firm 
size, deviations from marginal productivity theory generally seem limited. Our results have 
important implications for the distribution of income, the presence of optimizing behavior, and 
the existence of market power. 
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Derived from the assumption of individual maximization behavior and competitive markets, the
hypothesis that production factors are paid their marginal products is one of the main ingredients
of neo-classical economics. If one were to determine the share of contributions to theoretical or
applied economics making these assumptions, one would come to the conclusion that there are
few assumptions that are more widespread than the one that production factors are employed up
to the point where their remuneration equals their marginal product. This is, of course, not to
say that a large number of alternative theories about the determination of factor remunerations
exist. Some of these theories will be discussed below. Given the great importance of marginal
productivity theory however, it is puzzling that the task of testing this theory has received so
little attention in the literature. The literature review presented below suggests that the number
of studies explicitly testing marginal productivity theory is in stark contrast to the role this theory
plays in economics.
In this paper, we take a fresh look at testing marginal productivity theory empirically. We propose
a new approach that circumvents the need to specify a production function and compare the
implied marginal products to factor payments. Our approach rests on the simple intuition that,
if returns to scale are constant and production is homogenous, the fact that residual proﬁts (or
losses) exist is informative about whether each production factor was paid more or less than its
marginal product. The fact that we do not need to explicitly specify a production function appears
to be a major advantage over previous attempts to test marginal productivity theory as even small
amounts of misspeciﬁcation of the production technology may lead to the spurious ﬁnding that
factor payments do or do not equal marginal products. Our setup is in this respect also much less
restrictive than large parts of the economics literature which usually make the assumption that
the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, the CES form, the Translog form, or similar
parametric forms. We also do not make any behavioral assumptions such as proﬁt maximization,
or assumptions on price taking or price setting behavior. As a consequence, we will be able to
carry out powerful tests of whether such assumptions are consistent with the data.
The validity or invalidity of marginal productivity theory has important implications for diﬀerent
areas. As indicated above, marginal productivity theory rests on the assumption that ﬁrms
maximize proﬁts (or minimize costs), and that markets are competitive. Any deviation from
marginal productivity theory will therefore indicate a violation of either of these assumptions.
1Equality of factor payments and marginal products also plays an important role in considerations
of allocative eﬃciency. For example, in the general setup of the ﬁrst theorem of welfare economics,
a necessary condition for allocative eﬃciency is that production factors are paid their marginal
products. Another area which is directly connected to the remuneration of production factors is
the distribution of income. Indeed, this was one of the earliest questions economists dealt with.
Marginal productivity theory implies that each production factor receives the share it marginally
contributes to the overall product. This has both positive and normative implications.2
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we give an overview over related
literature we found. Section 3 presents the basic relationship between proﬁts, factor payments
and marginal products, which we use to test marginal productivity theory empirically. In section
4, we discuss our econometric methods. Section 5 presents our empirical results. In section 6,
we provide some interpretations of our ﬁndings, and section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In this section, we review some related literature. One of the earliest attempts to test marginal
productivity theory can be found in Bronfenbrenner/Douglas (1939) and Gunn/Douglas (1940,
1942). In these studies, the Cobb-Douglas production function is ﬁtted to manufacturing data
at the industry level, and implied marginal products are compared to industry wage averages.
The authors conclude that deviations from marginal productivity theory are small. While the
contribution of these papers to economics is undisputed (especially given the possibilities of data
collection and analysis at the time), it is clear that the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production
function is very restrictive. Further limitations are the use of value-added output and data at the
industry level which both imply diﬃcult aggregation issues.
A slightly more sophisticated approach to testing marginal productivity theory is adopted by Stein
(1958), who derives two implications from this theory and tests them using industry-level data
on average wages. Stein’s approach is also subject to the limitations described in the previous
paragraph. Some of the problems that arise in studies that use Stein’s methodology or the
methodology of the very early contributions are discussed in a critique of Stein’s article given in
Archibald (1960).
2For a discussion, see e.g. Friedman (1976).
2Another attempt to test whether capital and labor are paid their marginal products is by Thurow
(1968). Estimating diﬀerent variants of aggregate Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions
for the U.S. based on time series data on output, capital and labor for the years 1929 to 1965, the
article contrasts the implied marginal productivities with observed aggregate returns to capital and
labor over the same period. The author ﬁnds substantial discrepancies between implied marginal
products and observed aggregate returns. He concludes that, as a consequence, the economy is
in disequilibrium, and discusses possible reasons. Apart from the possible restrictiveness of the
production function used, the approach used in Thurow’s (1968) study clearly faces even more
severe aggregation problems than the studies cited before. Thurow’s result that capital receives
more and labor receives less than its marginal product was also obtained earlier by Hildenbrand/Liu
(1957) but based on industry data.
A general discussion of methodological problems involved in testing marginal productivity theory
is provided by Gottschalk/Tinbergen (1982). They list a number of possible issues such as
diﬀerent forms of aggregation problems or the diﬃculty to ﬁnd the correct speciﬁcation for the
production function. However, as we will show below, their claim that all tests of the marginal
productivity theory need to ﬁrst specify a production function and then compare implied marginal
productivities to observed factor payments does not seem to be correct.
The ﬁrst study that used a more disaggregated scheme of production factors in a test of the
marginal productivity theory appears to be Gottschalk (1978). Using industry data, Gottschalk
(1978) distinguishes between a number of diﬀerent occupations in both production and adminis-
tration. He also ﬁnds that capital receives more than it marginal product, while labor receives less.
Moreover, his results suggest that there are a number of discrepancies between marginal produc-
tivity and wages paid across occupations. Apart from the use of industry level data, Gottschalk’s
results are also subject to the criticism that a very speciﬁc production function is assumed, and
that value-added data is used. In addition to theoretical problems that may arise when working
with value-added data,3 the implied omission of intermediate inputs as production factors does
not allow one to address whether these factors receive more or less than their marginal products,
and it may bias the results on the validity of the marginal productivity theory for the input factors
explicitly included.
3A general critique of using value added data in studies involving production functions is given in Basu/Fernald
(1995).
3One of the ﬁrst studies that uses micro-economic data in a test of the marginal productivity
hypothesis is Frank (1984). Recognizing the fact that it is hard to estimate marginal productivity
in production processes that involve more than one factor, he focuses on a number of occupations
in which marginal productivity is relatively easily observed. The special focus of the paper is
on wage and productivity diﬀerences within a given institution rather than on deviations from
marginal productivity theory in general. Using data on automobile and real estate sales persons
as well as on university professors, and making a number of assumptions on the production
technology and ﬁrm behavior, the study ﬁnds that wages are more compressed within institutions
than productivities. This is an interesting result, although it is unclear to what extent it can be
generalized to occupations or sectors other than the ones considered.
Using a highly informative employer-employee data set, Hellerstein et al. (1999) also examine
whether wage diﬀerences between diﬀerent types of workers are consistent with diﬀerences in
estimated marginal productivities. Hellerstein et al. (1999) use micro-data, they distinguish
between diﬀerent types of labor, and they include materials as a production factor in their es-
timated production function. In our view, their study is one of the very few genuine empirical
studies of the marginal productivity hypothesis. A limitation of their contribution is that they
make explicit functional form assumptions when specifying the production function. Moreover,
as some of the other studies cited above, Hellerstein et al. (1999) only examine deviations from
the marginal productivity theory for the factor labor, but not for capital or intermediate inputs.
Their results suggest that relative wages indeed reﬂect relative marginal productivities, except for
the case of gender wage diﬀerentials. Using a very similar approach, Hellerstein/Neumark (1999)
investigate gender wage and productivity diﬀerentials in ﬁrm data from Israel. The conclusion
of this study is that relative wage diﬀerences with respect to gender are consistent with relative
marginal productivities.4
A very exciting recent study that addresses many of the issues we consider below is Dobbe-
laere/Mairesse (2011). Using panel data on French ﬁrms, Dobbelaere/Mairesse (2011) develop
a comprehensive approach to the joint estimation of production functions and imperfections in
product and labor markets. They theoretically distinguish between six diﬀerent regimes character-
ized by the perfectness or imperfectness of the product market and diﬀerent bargaining regimes
for the labor market. They then show how to nest these six regimes in a regression analysis
4Hellerstein et al. (1999) and Hellerstein/Neumark (1999) only make statements about relative deviations
from marginal productivity. This is something we will also relax below.
4that identiﬁes the diﬀerent parameters of market imperfections and bargaining regimes. Their
empirical results suggest that the predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the
product market and eﬃcient bargaining in the labor market (which implies that labor receives
more than its marginal product). We believe that with their results, Dobbelaere/Mairesse (2011)
make a substantial contribution to the literature. When we compare what assumptions they
make which we do no have to make, we ﬁnd that their speciﬁcation of the production function as
Cobb-Douglas is probably restrictive, and that they do not allow for the possibility of imperfect
input markets (which is something we allow for). On the other hand, they are in the position to
consider in great detail heterogeneity across ﬁrms and industries, which is something we will not
be able to address.5
3 Proﬁts and Marginal Productivity
In this section, we derive a simple equation that relates ﬁrms’ proﬁts to discrepancies between
factor payments and marginal products. To arrive at this equation, we only make the assumption
that the ﬁrms’ production function is homogenous, and that production at the ﬁrm level exhibits
constant returns to scale. We acknowledge that both assumptions may not be uncontroversial.
However, both of them are commonly made in both theory and empirical applications, suggesting
that our approach is not more restrictive than other approaches in the literature. Moreover, we
make no further assumptions on the parametric form of the production function, which makes
our approach less restrictive than much of the literature. As to the assumption of constant
returns to scale, there appears to be a consensus based on a large number of studies using a
variety of methodologies and data sets for diﬀerent countries, suggesting that returns to scale are
constant at the ﬁrm level. Examples include Griliches/Ringstad (1971), Nguyen/Reznek (1991),
Baily et al. (1992), Westbrook/Tybout (1993), Bregman et al. (1995), Levinsohn/Petrin (2003),
Abraham/White (2006), and Basu et al. (2009). Evidence based on industry level data is more
mixed, but ﬁndings presented, for example, in Basu/Fernald (1995, 1997), Burnside et al. (1995),
Oulton (1996), and Inklaar (2007) also suggest that there is little evidence against the hypothesis
that returns to scale are constant. We will also show that, if the assumption of constant returns
to scale is not met, our results can be interpreted as upper or lower bounds to the amount of
5We have to deal with sample size restrictions and the fat-tailedness of our data (see below). We will consider
ﬁrm size heterogeneity, however.
5over-/underpayment of production factors compared to their marginal products.
We start with the accounting identity stating that revenues are equal to the sum of costs for the
diﬀerent production factors, proﬁts, and taxes
PY = capital costs + labor costs + intermediate inputs + profits + taxes (1)
= rK + wL + qI + profits + taxes,
where P denotes product price, Y real output, K,L,I the input quantities of capital, labor, and
intermediate inputs and r,w,q their per-unit prices. Capital costs are meant to include all explicit
payments to capital holders, i.e. interest payments to creditors as well as dividends and other
withdrawals of equity by equity holders. Note that residual proﬁts (or losses) retained in the ﬁrm
automatically accrue to the ﬁrm’s owners and will therefore have to be taken into account when
assessing whether or not capital is over-/underpaid with respect to its marginal productivity (see
below).
Assuming homogeneity and constant returns to scale, real output Y can be written as
Y = fKK + fLL + fII, (2)
where fK,fL,fI denote the marginal products of capital, labor and intermediate inputs.

























i.e. real proﬁts before taxes are the sum of deviations between factor payments and marginal
products, weighted by input quantities. Equation (3) will be our basic vehicle for testing whether
factor payments equal marginal products.
In the following, we will use the notation



















. The case in which a particular
production factor, e.g. labor, can be subdivided into diﬀerent categories L1,L2,...,Lk yields
the analogous equation
π = βKK + βL1L1 + βL2L2 + ··· + βLkLk + βII. (5)
6The amount of over-/underpayment of production factor K,L1,L2,...,Lk,I can directly be read
oﬀ equation (5). Coeﬃcients β that are greater than zero indicate underpayment, coeﬃcients that
are less than zero indicate overpayment of a factor when compared to its marginal product. The
magnitude of β directly represents the amount of over-/underpayment per unit of the production
factor in question, measured in real money units.
4 Data
In order to implement our approach we need suﬃciently informative data. For our empirical
application use a rich panel data set on Chilean manufacturing plants earlier versions of which
have been used in a number of well-known studies.6 The data set is called ENIA (‘Encuesta
Nacional de la Industria Manufactuerera’) and was generously provided to us by the Instituto
Nacional de Estadisticas de Chile (INE). Our unbalanced panel covers 6,634 manufacturing plants
(most of which are single-plant ﬁrms) over the years 2001 to 2006.7 A particular advantage of
our data set is that it includes - besides general information on revenues, costs, intermediate
inputs and capital - detailed information on diﬀerent types of labor inputs. In particular, we will
be able to study whether, and to what extent, diﬀerent types of labor such as low/high-skilled
labor, managerial labor etc. receive more or less than their marginal product.
In the following, we give a description of the main variables used in our analysis. Our main
dependent variable is real proﬁt before taxes (see eq. (3)), which was constructed as revenues
minus all costs (excluding taxes). As indicated above, we include in the capital costs all explicit
payments to either creditors or equity holders, i.e. we also include dividend payments and reported
withdrawals of equity in the case of non-incorporated ﬁrms. We deﬂate proﬁts with a series of
low-level deﬂators (base year = 2003) at the four-digit industry level (‘Clasiﬁcation Industrial
Internacional Uniforme de todas las actividades economicas’, CIIU Rev.3) which is available from
the INE. Firms’ capital is measured in book values and was deﬂated by a deﬂator for capital goods
also provided by the INE. Intermediate inputs comprise all non-labor and non-capital inputs used
by the plant to produce output. We deﬂated intermediate inputs using a series of low-level
6See, for example, Lui (1993), Westbrook/Tybout (1993), Pavcnik (2002), Levinson/Petrin (2003, 2008).
7We do not use earlier years because i) the questionnaires were changed in 2001 rendering many variables
incomparable over time, ii) time-consistent, low-level price deﬂators for inputs and output are only available for
the period 2001 - 2006, and ii) the period 2001 - 2006 was one of stable business cycle conditions, see below.
7deﬂators for diﬀerent types of intermediate inputs at the four-digit industry level. Labor input is
measured in hours per year for diﬀerent labor categories. We can distinguish between labor input
by owners, managers, high-skilled workers that carry out tasks directly related to production,
low-skilled workers that carry out tasks directly related to production, low-skilled workers that
carry out tasks indirectly related to production, administrative personnel (accounting, electronic
data processing, excluding secretarial staﬀ), other services (secretarial staﬀ, catering, drivers,
security, cleaning personnel), and sales personnel.
Our data set is large enough to allow us to split our sample into several subsamples according
to plant size. This ensures that the plants under consideration are suﬃciently homogenous, and
it allows us to consider heterogeneity between plants of diﬀerent size. We deﬁne three groups i)
plants with 10 to 25 workers, ii) plants with 26 to 100 workers, and iii) plants with 101 to 1000
workers. We also analyze the total sample comprising plants with 10 to 1000 workers.8 Summary
statistics for our main variables in all subsamples and in the total sample are given in tables 14
to 17 in the appendix.
Figures 1 to 3 present some additional information for the total sample along with information on
the macro-economic environment during the period under consideration. The ﬁgures show that
the period 2001 to 2006 was one of stable growth both for the manufacturing sector and the rest
of the economy with almost constant and moderate inﬂation rates. Figure 2 shows in addition
that low-skilled production workers provided by far the highest share of labor input, followed by
high-skilled production workers. Labor input by other types of labor was less substantial.
— Figures 1 to 3 about here —
5 Econometric Implementation
Our goal is to estimate variants of eq. (3) on our data. However, our initial attempts using OLS-
methods yielded very unrobust and implausible results. The reason is that most of our variables, in
particular our dependent variable (proﬁt before taxes), turn out to be highly leptokurtic, i.e. they
are characterized by a large share of extreme observations (see tables 14 to 17). A common way
8The subsamples were deﬁned so that each subsample comprised suﬃciently many observations. We excluded
the small fraction of even larger plants as this would have added an extremely heterogenous group of plants and
would have exacerbated problems with outlying observations, see the discussion below.
8to deal with non-normal, highly leptokurtic variables in regression analysis is to trim the sample,
e.g. to discard the top and the bottom 1% of the data. Figure 4 compares the distribution of
our dependent variable and that of important covariates with the distribution after trimming for
the subsample of ﬁrms with 10 to 25 workers. It is clear that discarding the top and the bottom
1% of observations reduces the problem but still results in an extremely leptokurtic distribution.
This is all the more remarkable as, by construction, the subsample of ﬁrms with 10 to 25 workers
should be expected to exhibit a relatively high degree of homogeneity. We gradually extended the
share of discarded observations but this only led to a sequence of varying and unrobust estimation
results which were also erratic across alternative speciﬁcations.9 Even if one accepts the method
of gradually excluding extreme observations, one faces the problem that there is no natural way
to decide how large the share of excluded observations should be. This unsatisfactory situation
clearly calls for a more systematic approach.
— Figure 4 about here —
Robust methods for data characterized by a potentially large share of ‘outlying’ observations
have a long tradition in statistics, but have received relatively little attention in econometrics.
A good reference for robust statistical methods is Maronna et al. (2006). Up-to-date robust
regression routines have recently been made available for Stata by Verardi/Croux (2009) and
Jann (2010).10 The goal of robust methods is to provide estimation procedures that are robust in
the sense that estimation results are not overly inﬂuenced by the presence of extreme observations,
while retaining eﬃciency properties in the case when the data is not excessively characterized by
outlying observations (e.g. in the case of a Gaussian error distribution). The overall robustness
of an estimator can be characterized by the so-called breakdown point which is deﬁned as the
share of extreme observations up to which the inﬂuence of such observations on the estimates
remains bounded.
In the following, we use the so-called MM-estimator developed by Yohai (1987) which combines
a high breakdown point and a high Gaussian eﬃciency.11 For the regression
yi = θ0 + θ1x1i + ··· + θpxpi + εi = θxi + εi, (6)
9Similar experiences when using similar ﬁrm data are reported in Verardi/Wagner (2010).
10We use these routines for our estimations.
11A good description of this estimator is given in Verardi/Croux (2009).
9the MM estimator is deﬁned as










where ri(θ) = yi−θ0+θ1x1i+···+θpxpi and ˆ σS is a robust estimator of scale which is determined












if |u| ≤ k
1 if |u| > k.
(8)
The intuition behind the estimator deﬁned in (7) and (8) is clear: instead of considering squared
residuals when minimizing the sum of deviations from the regression plane, each residual under-
goes a transformation ρ(·) such that the inﬂuence of large residuals is dampened (depending on
the constant k).










= E (ρ(Z)) with Z ∼ N(0,1), (9)
where




The estimator ˆ θS is called an S-estimator and also has got robustness properties. Yohai (1987)
has shown that combining the ﬁrst step S-estimator in order to estimate the scale parameter ˆ σS
with the second step estimator deﬁned in (7) leads to an estimator ˆ θMM with a high breakdown
point and a high eﬃciency in the Gaussian case. Following Maronna et al. (2006), we chose a
breakdown point of 50% and an eﬃciency relative to the Gaussian case of 85%, which requires
setting k = 1.55 for the ﬁrst step S-estimator and k = 3.44 for the second step estimator.12
12A higher Gaussian eﬃciency leads to a higher bias caused by outlying observations. We also experimented
with lower breakpoints and higher/lower eﬃciencies. This did not change our results in any important way.
106 Empirical Results
Before we can present our empirical results, we have to return to the point that residual proﬁts (or
losses) will eventually be owned by capital holders and are therefore a part of the payments to the
input factor capital. Proﬁts (after taxes) have therefore also to be subtracted when calculating
the amount of over-/underpayment for the factor capital when compared to its marginal product.














= ˜ βK. (11)
We therefore also report in our results the mean of ˜ βK over all ﬁrms in the sample.
In our initial estimations we noticed that for a number of ﬁrms, the ratio of proﬁts/losses to
capital appearing in (11) was implausibly high or implausibly negative. In order to avoid that the
estimates of the average of ˜ βK across ﬁrms were overly inﬂuenced by such extreme values, we
dropped ﬁrms in the bottom 1% and those in top 1% of the distribution of the proﬁt to capital
ratio. Similarly, we detected a number of implausibly low or implausibly high values of the hourly
wage paid in a ﬁrm (which was computed as the ﬁrm’s cost of labor divided by the number of
hours employed by the ﬁrm). In some cases, this led to an implausible ranking of hourly wages
across qualiﬁcations which was corrected when we dropped very extreme observations (which
may always be a result of measurement/coding errors). We therefore also dropped the bottom
1% and the top 1% of hourly wage observations. Apart from these two adjustments, we did
not alter our data in any way. We emphasize that omitting the bottom and top 1% of proﬁt to
capital ratio and hourly wage observations did not change our robust regression results of our
central equation (3) in any important way. The adjustments described were solely made in order
to avoid implausible summary statistics for hourly wages and the quantity in (11).
6.1 Pooled Robust Regression
Our results from applying the robust MM-estimator to the four samples (ﬁrms with 10 to 25
workers, ﬁrms with 26 to 100 workers, ﬁrms with 101 to 1000 workers, and ﬁrms with 10 to
1000) are shown in tables 1, 3, 5, and 7. For our estimations, we pooled in each subsample ﬁrm
11observations over the years in order to increase the number of observations used in estimation.13
Table 1 shows the results for the group of ﬁrms with 10 to 25 workers. The ﬁrst entry in column
1 suggests that capital’s direct remuneration falls short of its marginal product by 6.15%.14. If
proﬁts and losses are included, capital is even more underpaid when compared to its marginal
product, namely by almost 13% on average. It seems surprising that including proﬁts decreases
capital’s remuneration but this is easily explained by the fact that over 50% of the ﬁrms with
10 to 25 workers actually operate with losses (see the second row of table 14). The cost of
intermediate inputs also falls short of their marginal contribution to output. More precisely, the
underpayment of intermediate inputs amounts to 4.2% pesos per peso spent on intermediate
inputs. By contrast, the factor labor seems to be slightly overpaid when compared to its marginal
product. The overpayment amounts to .1259 thousand pesos per hour. In order to assess whether
this is a large or a small amount, one can compare this ﬁgure to the average hourly wage in ﬁrms
with 10 to 25 workers, which is 2.034 thousand pesos (see ﬁrst row of table 2). Taken together,
this suggests that labor (including the labor input by owners) is overpaid by an amount of some
5% on average.
— Tables 1 and 2 about here —
The other columns of table 1 show some alternative speciﬁcations at diﬀerent aggregation levels
of the factor labor. The second but last column reveals that the observed direct remuneration
of owners’ labor substantially exceeded the corresponding marginal product. According to the
estimates, owners’ labor was overpaid by 1.0501 thousand pesos per hour worked, which amounts
to an overpayment of some 22% (the average hourly wage for labor supplied by owners was
4.655 thousand pesos, see table 14). This ﬁnding helps to resolve the puzzle that ﬁrms in
this size category systematically seem to make losses. It appears that owners extract part of the
remuneration that should actually be attributed to their capital through the remuneration of their
labor which exceeds its marginal product. This is plausible given the small size and the probably
13We also carried out regressions by year. They conveyed a similar picture, but in many cases coeﬃcients were
just statistically insigniﬁcant.
14According to equation (4) capital is underpaid by an amount of .0615 times 1000 Chilean pesos per 1000
Chilean pesos capital invested (all variables except labor are expressed in thousands of Chilean pesos), or equiva-
lently, by .0615 pesos per peso invested. The over-/underpayment of intermediate inputs has a similar interpre-
tation. It is the peso amount of over-/underpayment per peso spent on intermediate inputs. The interpretation
of the labor coeﬃcient is the over-/underpayment in thousands of pesos per unit of labor (i.e. per hour).
12mostly unincorporated nature of these ﬁrms. The point that owners’ income from capital and the
remuneration of their labor are likely to mix up in practice is also considered in detail in Gollin
(2002). The second but last column of table 1 suggests that managers in ﬁrms with 10 to 25
workers were also slightly overpaid (by some 7%), similarly low skilled production workers (by
10%) and sales personnel (by 6%), although many of these eﬀects are only marginally signiﬁcant.
The intermediate results in column table 1 demonstrate that the estimates are consistent across
diﬀerent levels of aggregation of the factor labor.
Turning to the results for ﬁrms with 26 to 100 workers, the ﬁrst entry in table 3 suggests that, not
taking account of proﬁts, capital is underpaid by some 6.55%. If proﬁts are taken into account,
capital is actually overpaid by about by 13.65% when compared to its marginal product. Labor
as a whole is also slightly overpaid when compared to its marginal product. The overpayment
amounts to 198.5 pesos per hour, which is about 7.8% above the marginal product of an additional
hour of labor (the hourly wage of labor employed in ﬁrms with 26 to 100 workers is 2.530 thousand
pesos, see table 4). Again, the amount paid by the ﬁrms for intermediate inputs falls short of
their marginal contribution to production of output. The underpayment of intermediate inputs
amounts to some 5%. Overall, it seems that ﬁrms with 26 to 100 workers generate rents from
underpaying intermediate products which are distributed to labor and capital. Again, the second
but last column gives more detailed results as to which types of labor are overpaid. It seems that
in particular, high-skilled production workers are slightly overpaid (by some 4%), similarly low-
skilled production workers (by some 9%), and, in particular, low-skilled workers whose work is only
indirectly related to production (by some 18%). Note however, that in most cases these eﬀects are
only marginally signiﬁcant. For all other labor categories, one cannot reject the hypothesis that
their remuneration equals their marginal contribution to producing output at any conventional
signiﬁcance level.
— Tables 3 and 4 about here —
The results for ﬁrms with 101 to 1000 workers are given in table 5. Again, capital is underpaid
compared to its marginal product when proﬁts are not taken into account. However, if proﬁts are
included, the remuneration of capital exceeds its marginal product by 358.4 pesos per 1000 pesos
invested. Again, intermediate inputs are underpaid compared to their marginal contribution. The
amount of underpayment is higher for these larger ﬁrms than for the smaller ﬁrms discussed above
(some 9% compared to 4 or 5%), which is plausible as larger ﬁrms probably have more market
13power on input markets (see the additional discussion below). The factor labor receives about
its marginal product in ﬁrms with 101 to 1000 workers (see ﬁfth row of table 5). In these ﬁrms,
workers seem to have less bargaining power compared to smaller ﬁrms in which the factor labor
appeared to engage in rent sharing with the factor capital. A closer look at diﬀerent types of labor
(see second but last column of table 5) reveals that none of the diﬀerent labor groups manages
to earn more than their marginal products (except maybe owners which however represent only
a tiny fraction of workers in the given size class of ﬁrms).
— Tables 5 and 6 about here —
Finally, table 7 displays the results for the whole sample, i.e. for ﬁrms with 10 to 1000 workers.
The results nicely reﬂect the average ﬁndings over the three size categories considered earlier.
Capital is underpaid by some 8% if proﬁts are not taken into account, and overpaid by some
9% if proﬁts are taken into account. Intermediate inputs are slightly underpaid (by 3%), while
labor receives about its marginal product. The fact that the remuneration of labor supplied by
owners exceeds their marginal product in small ﬁrms is still visible in the aggregate results for the
whole manufacturing sector. Taken together, while there are some diﬀerences with respect to
ﬁrm size, the results for the whole manufacturing sector suggest that there are some deviations
from marginal productivity theory on average (capital receives more, intermediate inputs less than
their marginal products), but the overall picture ﬁts surprisingly well with the hypothesis that the
remuneration of production factors follows their marginal productivity.
— Tables 7 and 8 about here —
6.2 OLS on Robust Subsample
As a robustness check and in order to prepare the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimations presented below, we
also carried out OLS estimations on a subsample which was ‘cleaned’ of outliers. A major virtue
of robust statistical methods is that they are not only robust to (potentially substantial amounts
of) outlying observations but that they also provide ways to identify outlying observations. In
the following, we exclude (in each subsample) observations that are outliers in the sense that
they are too far from the (robustly estimated) regression hyperplane. Our precise deﬁnition of an
outlier is an observation for which |ri(ˆ θMM)/ˆ σS| > c0.99, where c0.99 is the 99th percentile of the
14standard normal distribution (this is motivated by the fact that the standardized MM-residuals
asymptotically follow a standard normal distribution).15 Tables 18 to 21 in the appendix show
the results for OLS on the robust subsamples. The estimates are almost identical to those of the
MM-regressions but standard errors are in many cases much lower (which is to be expected given
that the elimination of outliers also reduces sample variability).
6.3 Fixed-Eﬀects Estimation on Robust Subsample
In order to rule out that our estimates are biased by endogeneity problems due to omitted
unobserved productivity determinants, we also conducted ﬁxed-eﬀects within-estimations on the
subsamples cleaned of outliers. These results are reported in tables 9 to 12. In principle, the
estimates are similar to OLS on the robust subsample or MM-estimation on the full sample, but the
coeﬃcients generally appear to be attenuated towards zero. For example, in ﬁrms with 10 to 25
workers, the underpayment of capital (in the case where proﬁts are ignored) is about 3% compared
to 6% in the robust regression case (see table 1). Also, the underpayment of intermediate inputs
and the overpayment of labor vanishes, if the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator is applied to the robust
subsample of ﬁrms with 10 to 25 workers. Similarly, in the case of ﬁrms with 26 to 100 workers,
the underpayment of intermediate inputs and the overpayment of labor is also reduced towards
zero (table 10). In the case of ﬁrms with 101 to 1000 workers, ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation on the
robust subsample suggests that real intermediate inputs and labor receive about their marginal
product, whereas capital is overpaid (if proﬁts are taken into account, see table 11). This result
is economically inconsistent as under the assumption of constant returns to scale, one production
factor can only be overpaid if another one is underpaid. Finally, the ﬁxed-eﬀects results for the
whole sample shown in table 12 are again very close to the corresponding robust regression results
in table 7, except that the coeﬃcients seem slightly attenuated towards zero.
It is well known that the within-estimator is much more susceptible to measurement error than
OLS methods as the signal to noise ratio may be drastically reduced by applying the within-
15In this way, we exclude so-called ‘vertical outliers’ as well as ‘bad leverage points’, see e.g. Verardi/Croux
(2009) or Dehon et al. (2009). We do not exclude so-called ‘good leverage points’ which lie near the regression
hyperplane but are characterized by extreme values of the covariates. Dehon et al. (2009) argue that not excluding
good leverage points may in some cases lead to an overestimation of statistical signiﬁcance. As we are interested in
detecting (possibly small) deviations from marginal productivity theory, it seems more appropriate not to exclude
good leverage points as they are likely to add statistical power.
15transformation. In this case, the within-estimator may even be more biased than the OLS esti-
mator (Griliches/Hausman (1986)). Our evidence points in this direction as the within-estimates
are uniformly attenuated towards zero when compared to the OLS and MM regression results.
In any case, given that OLS and within-estimates are generally quite close, we conclude that our
previous estimates are not systematically biased due to the omission of unobserved productivity
diﬀerences. If anything, the ﬁxed-eﬀects results move our evidence further in the direction of the
full validity of the marginal productivity theory.
6.4 Other Estimators
We have also experimented16 with the robust ﬁxed eﬀects estimators described in Bramati/Croux
(2007), which are based on carrying out a ‘robust’ within-transformation (using the median
instead of the mean over time) and then applying robust estimators to the transformed data. This
basically led the situation that all regression coeﬃcients were equal to zero, both in economic
and statistical terms. As indicated above, such a result is economically inconsistent under the
assumptions made if non-zero proﬁts are present, as it would imply that capital is overpaid,
but no other factor is underpaid. If anything, this would only be consistent under decreasing
returns to scale as, in this case, marginal productivity remunerations do not exhaust the overall
product so that one factor necessarily receives more than its marginal product.17 However, there
is no empirical evidence for decreasing returns at the ﬁrm level (see section 3), and decreasing
returns at the ﬁrm level are implausible from a theoretical point of view if proﬁts are present (see
Basu/Fernald (1995), p. 182, and below). We ﬁnd it more likely that the result that all regression
coeﬃcients are equal to zero is due to the fact that the fat-tailedness of our data reduces the
signal to noise ratio of our variables after the within-transformation so much that no signiﬁcant
relationships can be identiﬁed.
Finally, we have also tried out the methods introduced by Arellano/Bover (1995) and Blun-
dell/Bond (2000), which are based on ﬁrst-diﬀerencing and using lagged variables as instruments.
Apart from the fact that in many cases overidentiﬁcation tests failed, these methods also led to
results that were economically implausible (or even nonsensical), or inconsistent over speciﬁca-
tions (for example results contradicted each other when diﬀerent aggregation levels of the factor
16Results are available on request.
17In the case of increasing returns to scale, marginal productivity remunerations add up to more than the overall
product, see below.
16labor were used). We therefore conclude that these methods are ill-suited for our kind of fat-tailed
data (similar experiences are reported in Levinsohn/Petrin (2003), p. 336). The same is true for
methods using the Swamy methodology such as the ones applied in Dobbelaere/Mairesse (2011).
Apart from the fact that our sample sizes seem too small to estimate heterogeneity distributions,
these methods are also based on least squares and therefore seem ill-suited for our data.
7 Interpretation of Results
7.1 Explanations for Deviations from Marginal Productivity Theory
Our results suggest moderate deviations from marginal productivity theory in some cases. How
can such deviations be explained? We start with a basic model of proﬁt maximization in possibly
imperfect input and output markets. The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt
π = P(Y )Y − r(K)K − w(L)L − q(I)I with Y = f(K,L,I), (12)
where P(Y ) denotes the inverse demand function for output, and r(K),w(L),q(I) the inverse



























where εY,P,εr,K,εw,L,εq,I are the elasticities of the inverse demand and the inverse supply
functions, respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions show that proﬁt maximization requires that
production factors are always paid their marginal product or less, equality holding in the
case of perfect competition in the output market (εY,P = −∞) and in the input markets
(εr,K = εw,L = εq,I = 0). This means that under proﬁt maximization a production factor
will never receive more than its marginal product, and underpayment of a factor is consistent
with either monopolistic power in the output market (εY,P = −c < 0), or market power in the
input markets (for example, εw,L > 0 or εq,I > 0).
We found moderate but signiﬁcant overpayment of capital, and, in some cases, of labor. While
overpayment of capital can be explained by the fact that residual proﬁts automatically accrue to
17capital owners (see below), a direct implication of an overpayment of (non-owners’) labor would
be that ﬁrms’ behavior is not entirely consistent with pure proﬁt maximization. Moreover, the
fact that labor is over- rather than underpaid in some cases implies that our data provides little
evidence for theories of monopsonistic labor demand stating that employers exploit immobility,
search frictions or preference heterogeneity on the side of the employees in order to capture part of
their marginal product (Bhaskar et al. (2002), Manning (2003), Cahuc/Zylberberg (2004)). On
the other hand, our result that intermediate inputs are to a certain extent underpaid is consistent
with the hypothesis that ﬁrms exert some market power in markets for intermediate inputs. This
is plausible given that long-term relationships between ﬁrms and their suppliers may enable the
ﬁrms to enforce lower prices. A plausible prediction arising from the hypothesis that ﬁrms exert
market power in intermediate input markets is that their monopsonistic power is the greater, the
larger the ﬁrm is. This prediction is supported by our results, i.e. the amount of underpayment
increases with ﬁrm size (see third row of tables 1, 3 and 5).
Another general explanation for factor payments below marginal products is uncertainty (output
price uncertainty and demand uncertainty). In the case of uncertainty, risk-averse ﬁrms will
underpay (and underuse) inputs (Leland (1972) and Batra/Ullah (1974)). However, as we do not
observe underpayment of all production factors (we only observe underpayment of intermediate
inputs), we conclude that uncertainty plays no leading role in explaining diﬀerences between factor
payments and marginal products, or at least, it is dominated by other factors. Similarly, even
without monopsonistic power in input markets (εr,K = εw,L = εq,I = 0), factor remunerations
may fall short of marginal products if the ﬁrm has monopolistic power in the output market
(εY,P = −c < 0). Again, as we do not observe uniform underpayment of all production factors (we
only observe underpayment of intermediate inputs), we conclude that monopolistic power in the
output market is unlikely to be the only explanation for diﬀerences between factor remunerations
and marginal products, At least in the case of capital and labor, there must be other aspects
that dominate a possibly depressing eﬀect of monopolistic power in output markets on factor
remunerations.
What are other aspects that possibly explain the (in some cases) existing overpayment of capital
and labor over their marginal product? In the case of capital, an explanation is easy as the ﬁrms’
owners may capture any residual income resulting after all other production factors have been
remunerated. They may even extract parts of the ﬁrm’s equity as a payment, although this would
run down the ﬁrm’s capital stock and therefore the ﬁrm owners’ assets. However, it is interesting
that in our data capital is only overpaid (compared to its marginal product) if residual proﬁts are
18taken into account. Our results suggest that even if all explicitly reported payments to capital
holders are counted (interest payments, dividends and other payments to equity holders), the
payments to capital holders fall short of their marginal contribution to output (see ﬁrst row of
the tables showing the regression results). It is only after the residual income retained in the
ﬁrms (this is our variable profit) are attributed to capital holders that capital’s remuneration on
average exceeds its marginal contribution to output.18
What are possible explanations for an overpayment of the factor labor? A leading model that
potentially explains how wages can exceed marginal products is McDonald/Solow (1981). In this
model, employees have bargaining power allowing them to bargain with employers at the ﬁrm
level over both wages and employment. The intuition of the model lies in the insight that the
same level of proﬁts may be reached with a higher employment than the ﬁrm would choose if
bargaining was only over wages, or if ﬁrms were price-takers with respect to wages. As employees
prefer more employment to less employment, eﬃcient bargaining then implies that employment
is extended to a point where the marginal product of labor is already below the paid wage. The
model requires that employees have bargaining power. Possible sources of bargaining power are
worker unionization on the one hand, and the costs of ﬁring, hiring and training workers on the
other. Unionization in Chile is relatively low (see Lawrence/Ishikawa (2005)) but employees may
be in the position to exploit the fact that it is costly to replace them.
A similar argument is used in insider-outsider models, where wages may rise up to the point
where they equal marginal products plus turnover costs (Lindbeck/Snower (1987, 1988), Solow
(1985)). Turnover costs consist of the direct costs of hiring and ﬁring but may also include the
potential loss of speciﬁc human capital caused by the exit of workers who previously received
training in the ﬁrm. Cahuc/Zylberberg (2004, p. 264) describe the hold-up problem that arises
when ﬁrms have the opportunity to invest in workers’ speciﬁc human capital, leading to the
situation that they have to share the returns to this investment (and associated investments in
production technologies) with the workers. Note that in our data, we observe some (not very
substantial) overpayment of the factor labor only in small and medium-sized ﬁrms. This may
indicate that, in the absence of wide-spread oﬃcial collective bargaining by trade unions, there
may be implicit bargaining between employers and workers at the ﬁrm level, which is easier in
small and medium-sized ﬁrms where the work force is smaller. Also, the personal relationship
18An exception are small ﬁrms where we suspect that remunerations of owners’ capital mix up with remunera-
tions of their labor inputs, see above.
19between employees and ﬁrm owners tends to be much closer in smaller ﬁrms, which may lead
to the situation that ﬁrm owners care more about their employees’ employment security than in
large ﬁrms. This may be exploited by employees when bargaining about wages and employment
at the ﬁrm level.
7.2 Non-Constant Returns to Scale
In this section, we explore how our results should be interpreted if returns to scale are not constant.
In this case, equation (2) is replaced by
αY = fKK + fLL + fII, (14)
where α is the scale elasticity (α < 1 for decreasing, and α > 1 for increasing returns to scale).
An immediate consequence of (14) is that in the case of decreasing returns, the sum of marginal
products does not exhaust the overall product, while in the case of increasing returns, it more
than exhausts the overall product. This means that in the case of decreasing returns, at least
one factor has to receive more than its marginal product, while in the case of increasing returns
at least one factor has to receive less than its marginal product.































As a consequence, the interpretation of our estimated coeﬃcients in front of the production




























≤ 0 (overpayment is underestimated) (17)




























R 0 (indeﬁnite) (19)
Decreasing returns to scale at the ﬁrm level seem unlikely, for two reasons (see Basu/Fernald
(1995, 1997)). Firstly, the possibility of replication suggests that returns to scale should in general
20not be falling. Secondly, extending the argument in Basu/Fernald (1995, 1997) to the case of
imperfect input markets (see appendix), one can show that under cost minimization




where µ is the markup-ratio, i.e. the ratio of price to marginal cost, and d = r′(K)K2 +
w′(L)L2 + q′(I)I2 ≥ 0 (because r′(K) ≥ 0, w′(L) ≥ 0, q′(I) ≥ 0, see above).
Given information on α,d,revenues, and costs, equation (20) implies an estimate for the markup-
ratio. Assuming d = 0 (no market power in input markets), table 13 shows implied markups for
our four subsamples. Basu/Fernald (1995, 1997) argue that sharply decreasing returns to scale
are implausible because they tend to imply markup-ratios below one (ﬁrms price their products
below marginal costs, which does not make sense). Equation (20) shows that this is even more
severe if ﬁrms have market power in input markets, because then implied markups are further
depressed (via d > 0). The implied markups in table 13 are therefore upper bounds on actual
markups. As one can see, markups tend to be implausibly low – except for large ﬁrms – if one
assumes decreasing returns to scale α = 0.9. If d > 0 (for which we have evidence) they are
smaller than one in most cases.
— Table 13 about here —
As indicated in section 3, there is plenty of evidence in favor of constant returns to scale at the
ﬁrm level. If however, returns to scale are not exactly constant, the arguments in the previous
paragraphs suggest that they are increasing. In this case, equations (18) and (19) show that
any underpayment is underestimated, while no deﬁnite statement is possible for the case of
overpayment. The analysis above also shows (see equation (15)) that for increasing α, there is a
point from which on all factors will be paid less than their marginal products. The deeper reason
for this is that in the case of increasing returns to scale, marginal productivity remunerations add
up to more than the overall product, making it necessary that at least one of the factor receives
less than its marginal product for high enough α.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored a new approach to testing the empirical validity of marginal
productivity theory. Our test is based on the fact that under constant returns to scale, ﬁrms
21proﬁts are informative about whether individual production factors are over- or underpaid when
compared to their marginal products. For our analysis, we do not need to assume any speciﬁc
parametric form for the production technology. This appears to be a major advantage over
previous attempts to test marginal productivity theory as even small amounts of misspeciﬁcation
of the production function may lead to the spurious ﬁnding that factor payments do or do not equal
marginal products. We also do not make behavioral assumptions such as proﬁt maximization, or
assumptions about price taking or price setting behavior. As a consequence, we are able to carry
out powerful direct tests of whether such assumptions are consistent with the data. Our analysis
also demonstrates that the simplicity of our approach comes at the cost of having to deal with
typically highly fat-tailed proﬁt data. We show that this requires the use of robust statistical
methods.
Our results using data on manufacturing ﬁrms in Chile suggest moderate deviations from marginal
productivity theory that also depend on ﬁrm size. For small ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that labor input by
non-owners is overpaid in some cases, while capital and intermediate inputs tend to be slightly
underpaid. The fact that the explicit payments to capital fall short of its marginal product appears
to be related to an overpayment of ﬁrm owners’ labor input, indicating that in small ﬁrms the
remuneration of ﬁrm owners’ labor input cannot be separately identiﬁed from the remuneration
of their capital input. For medium-sized ﬁrms we also ﬁnd that non-owners’ labor input is slightly
overpaid in some cases, indicating that employees may have a certain degree of bargaining power.
One should note however, that in most cases these eﬀects are only marginally signiﬁcant. Capital
is also slightly overpaid in medium-sized ﬁrms but only if the residual proﬁts retained in ﬁrms
are taken into account as a part of capital’s remuneration. As in small ﬁrms, the contribution
of intermediate inputs to output is slightly larger than their costs. The latter is also true for
large ﬁrms, where the amount of underpayment of intermediate inputs is even larger than in
small and medium-sized ﬁrms. This suggests that market power in input markets increases with
ﬁrm size. In large ﬁrms, the proﬁts obtained from the underpayment of intermediate inputs
solely accrue to capital holders, while the factor labor only receives its marginal product. This
indicates that in large ﬁrms, employees do not have additional bargaining power. Overall, given
that the overpayment of the factor labor that is observed in some cases of small to medium-sized
ﬁrms is only marginally signiﬁcant, a fair description of the evidence found is that there are
moderate deviations from marginal productivity theory in the form that capital receives more and
intermediate inputs receive slightly less than their marginal product.
22We believe that our results provide interesting possibilities for future research. Our empirical
application used data for Chile whose economic system is that of a liberal market economy similar
to that of the United States. While the results presented here are probably also representative
for other countries with similar economic conditions, this is certainly not the case for countries
such as those of continental Europe in which trade unions play a much more important role, and
market freedom is restricted by a variety of institutional settings. We expect this to have a severe
impact on possible deviations of factor payments from marginal products. In any way, it will be
interesting to apply the approach described above to other sources on ﬁrm data such as those
for the U.S. or major European countries. Unfortunately, access to such data sets is still severely
restricted.19 Depending on the richness of the data available, it will also be interesting to look
at higher levels of disaggregation, for example to look at the amount of over- or underpayment
of diﬀerent forms of capital such as equity and external capital, or that of diﬀerent categories of
intermediate inputs.
19The need to relax these restrictions is also felt in many other ﬁelds of economics, see for example Card (2011).
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3011 Tables
Table 1 – Robust Regression: Firms with 10-25 workers (7,312/20,448 observations)a
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0615 (.0137) .0807 (.0134) .0806 (.0134)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) .1299 (.0575) .1491 (.0575) .1489 (.0574)
Real intermediate inputs .0420 (.0069) .0417 (.0071) .0414 (.0074)
Labor (all categories) -.1259 (.0513)
Labor category 1b -.7542 (.1886)
Labor category 2 -.0763 (.0580)
Labor category 3 -.1506 (.0741)
Labor category 4 -.1216 (.0611)
Owners -1.0501 (.2601)
Managers -.4319 (.2396)
High-skilled (production) -.0563 (.0622)
Low-skilled (production) -.1268 (.0623)
Low-skilled (non-production) -.0868 (.1679)
Administration -.2415 (.1316)
Other services .5378 (.2934)
Sales personnel -.1655 (.0759)
Constantc -8479.72 (2286.48) -8803.16 (2300.33) -8565.38 (2356.76)
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
31Table 2 – Real hourly wages of workers in ﬁrms with 10-25 workers, in thousands of pesosa
Mean Std.Dev. 10% 25% 50 % 75% 90 %
All workers 2.034 1.220 .956 1.204 1.700 2.468 3.46474
Labor category 1b 5.314 5.636 1.104 2.188 4.349 6.707 10.417
Labor category 2 2.253 3.681 .928 1.230 1.777 2.661 4.016
Labor category 3 2.408 2.600 .706 .932 1.442 2.901 5.275
Labor category 4 1.606 1.207 .805 1.018 1.347 1.82 2.560
Owners 4.655 5.790 .955 1.812 3.759 6.327 8.637
Managers 6.017 4.933 1.372 2.552 4.759 7.753 12.386
High-skilled (production) 2.571 4.315 .960 1.283 1.892 3.038 4.907
Low-skilled (production) 1.656 1.372 .822 1.036 1.375 1.855 2.647
Low-skilled (non-production) 1.772 2.363 .763 .990 1.366 2.044 2.843
Administration 2.100 1.524 .871 1.164 1.704 2.596 3.735
Other services 1.449 1.218 .687 .904 1.22 1.666 2.229
Sales personnel 2.408 2.600 .706 .932 1.442 2.901 5.275
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Nominal wages deﬂated by CPI (base year 2003).
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
32Table 3 – Robust Regression: Firms with 26-100 workers (8,446/20,448 observations)a
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0655 (.0154) .0653 (.0144) .0651 (.0149)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) -.1365 (.0352) -.1366 (.0354) -.1368 (.0354)
Real intermediate inputs .0522 (.0170) .0525 (.0158) .0530 (.0152)
Labor (all categories) -.1985 (.0822)
Labor category 1b -.3689 (.5320)
Labor category 2 -.1721 (.0880)
Labor category 3 -.3033 (.1703)
Labor category 4 -.1938 (.0753)
Owners -.9555 (.7229)
Managers -.0150 (.6008)
High-skilled (production) -.1451 (.0826)
Low-skilled (production) -.1577 (.0718)
Low-skilled (non-production) -.4181 (.1437)
Administration -.2687 (.2574)
Other services -.3264 (.3459)
Sales personnel -.2618 (.1534)
Constantc -2677.86 (5044.95) -2346.24 (5043.4) -1768.59 (5156.72)
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
33Table 4 – Real hourly wages of workers in ﬁrms with 26-100 workers, in thousands of pesosa
Mean Std.Dev. 10% 25% 50 % 75% 90 %
All workers 2.530 1.560 1.121 1.522 2.155 3.025 4.253
Labor category 1b 9.263 7.825 2.414 4.474 6.978 11.912 18.333
Labor category 2 2.979 1.977 1.215 1.746 2.577 3.658 5.087
Labor category 3 4.105 3.708 1.005 1.625 3.100 5.380 8.402
Labor category 4 1.850 1.308 .912 1.185 1.612 2.146 2.942
Owners 7.125 5.907 1.885 3.388 6.031 8.366 14.053
Managers 10.368 8.476 2.758 5.026 8.131 13.381 20.083
High-skilled (production) 3.594 2.841 1.263 1.859 2.889 4.540 6.579
Low-skilled (production) 1.886 1.956 .900 1.177 1.585 2.149 2.954
Low-skilled (non-production) 2.247 1.735 .894 1.316 1.910 2.707 3.776
Administration 2.793 1.886 1.127 1.646 2.370 3.408 4.799
Other services 1.890 10.006 .793 1.062 1.442 2.009 2.831
Sales personnel 4.105 3.708 1.005 1.625 3.100 5.380 8.402
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Nominal wages deﬂated by CPI (base year 2003).
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
34Table 5 – Robust Regression: Firms with 101-1000 workers (4,690/20,448 observations)a
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .1093 (.0341) .1073 (.0325) .1012 (.0321)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) -.3584 (.0454) -.3603 (.0437) -.3665 (.0433)
Real intermediate inputs .0892 (.0180) .0897 (.0172) .1016 (.0177)
Labor (all categories) .1101 (.1551)
Labor category 1b -3.1273 (3.3483)
Labor category 2 .2041 ( .2760)
Labor category 3 -.5343 ( .4550)
Labor category 4 .1951 ( .1774)
Owners -11.6090 (6.7965)
Managers -1.1584 (3.5937)
High-skilled (production) .2467 (.2865)
Low-skilled (production) .1266 (.1638)
Low-skilled (non-production) .7245 (.6058)
Administration -1.6608 (1.2318)
Other services 1.1175 (2.1841)
Sales personnel -.5502 (.4538)
Constantc 22475.98 (77531.82) 39548.25 (79342.13) 72964.82 (81931.40)
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
35Table 6 – Real hourly wages of workers in ﬁrms with 101-1000 workers, in thousands of pesosa
Mean Std.Dev. 10% 25% 50 % 75% 90 %
All workers 3.227 2.472 1.317 1.834 2.632 3.916 5.583
Labor category 1b 17.115 13.264 5.331 8.681 14.726 21.873 30.140
Labor category 2 4.123 3.228 1.724 2.465 3.511 4.939 6.820
Labor category 3 6.474 9.716 1.507 2.724 5.161 8.245 11.885
Labor category 4 2.419 4.787 .993 1.377 1.896 2.656 3.812
Owners 14.102 14.935 3.555 5.918 8.431 19.052 30.065
Managers 17.229 13.290 5.358 8.892 14.743 21.914 30.378
High-skilled (production) 4.875 5.206 1.718 2.558 3.901 5.811 8.480
Low-skilled (production) 2.562 8.277 .935 1.296 1.781 2.499 3.598
Low-skilled (non-production) 3.119 13.707 1.120 1.672 2.419 3.484 4.752
Administration 4.002 5.141 1.586 2.299 3.281 4.629 6.443
Other services 2.211 3.019 .848 1.164 1.674 2.478 3.687
Sales personnel 6.474 9.716 1.507 2.724 5.161 8.245 11.885
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Nominal wages deﬂated by CPI (base year 2003).
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
36Table 7 – Robust Regression: Firms with 10-1000 workers (total sample, 20,448 observations)a
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0781 (.0303) .0730 (.0242) .0476 (.0194)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) -.0890 (.0404) -.0940 (.0351) -.1194 (.0332)
Real intermediate inputs .0299 (.0164) .0565 (.0143) .0360 (.0131)
Labor (all categories) -.1009 (.0660)
Labor category 1b -.8582 (.4294)
Labor category 2 -.1952 (.0818)
Labor category 3 -.1645 (.1315)
Labor category 4 -.1470 (.0583)
Owners -.9578 (.3816)
Managers -.0704 (.4550)
High-skilled (production) -.0659 (.0709)
Low-skilled (production) -.0407 (.0501)
Low-skilled (non-production) -.0864 (.1408)
Administration -.1302 (.3252)
Other services -.0690 (.3706)
Sales personnel -.1218 (.1220)
Constantc -7168.47 (2967.40) -7429.12 (2765.92) -4380.57 (2834.51)
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
37Table 8 – Real hourly wages of workers in ﬁrms with 10-1000 workers, in thousands of pesosa
Mean Std.Dev. 10% 25% 50 % 75% 90 %
All workers 2.512 1.771 1.056 1.426 2.083 3.027 4.360
Labor category 1b 9.931 10.003 1.881 3.934 6.872 13.113 21.034
Labor category 2 3.011 3.033 1.095 1.599 2.476 3.727 5.32337
Labor category 3 4.175 5.792 .870 1.374 2.829 5.523 8.9312
Labor category 4 1.912 2.644 .884 1.150 1.582 2.177 3.059
Owners 6.914 8.127 1.261 2.769 5.457 7.629 13.898
Managers 11.628 10.675 2.470 4.883 8.732 15.531 23.546
High-skilled (production) 3.637 4.141 1.155 1.719 2.790 4.538 6.803
Low-skilled (production) 1.985 4.454 .878 1.146 1.559 2.151 3.039
Low-skilled (non-production) 2.463 8.357 .891 1.288 1.953 2.871 4.067
Administration 2.894 3.090 1.038 1.541 2.369 3.541 5.062
Other services 1.910 7.028 .779 1.051 1.462 2.080 3.048
Sales personnel 4.175 5.792 .870 1.374 2.829 5.523 8.931
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Nominal wages deﬂated by CPI (base year 2003).
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
38Table 9 – Fixed eﬀects on robust subsample: Firms with 10-25 workersa
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0318 (.0137) .0521 (.0137) .0534 (.0136)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) .1002 (.0532) .1205 (.0532) .1218 (.0531)
Real intermediate inputs .0091 (.0118) .0153 (.0118) .0138 (.0118)
Labor (all categories) -.0928 (.0728)
Labor category 1b -.4767 (.2216)
Labor category 2 -.0453 (.0918)
Labor category 3 -.1688 (.1269)
Labor category 4 -.0720 (.0805)
Owners -.8744 (.3545)
Managers -.2096 (.2801)
High-skilled (production) -.0074 (.0989)
Low-skilled (production) -.0693 (.0864)
Low-skilled (non-production) -.0110 (.1541)
Administration -.2390 (.2030)
Other services .5675 (.2756)
Sales personnel -.1213 (.1312)
Constantc 3261.61 (3924.11) 716.92 (3984.59) 816.19 (3975.64)
Size robust subsample 6,112 6,114 6,113
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
39Table 10 – Fixed eﬀects on robust subsample: Firms with 26-100 workersa
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0386 (.0097) .0387 (.0097) .0399 (.0098)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) -.1633 (.0293) -.1632 (.0293) -.1620 (.0293)
Real intermediate inputs .0198 (.0099) .0204 (.0099) .0202 (.0100)
Labor (all categories) -.1366 (.0655)
Labor category 1b -.2139 (.4835)
Labor category 2 -.1880 (.0958)
Labor category 3 -.6575 (.2205)
Labor category 4 -.0699 (.0735)
Owners .0278 (1.0873)
Managers -.1860 (.5229)
High-skilled (production) -.2197 (.1083)
Low-skilled (production) -.0495 (.0827)
Low-skilled (non-production) -.0165 (.1864)
Administration .0210 (.2762)
Other services -.6428 (.4390)
Sales personnel -.6725 (.2166)
Constantc 37244.10 (10066.03) 37905.82 (10219.55) 35378.55 (10575.29)
Size robust subsample 6,759 6,759 6,753
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
40Table 11 – Fixed eﬀects on robust subsample: Firms with 101-1000 workersa
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0755 (.0129) .0774 (.0135) .0826 (.0138)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) -.3921 (.0290) -.3902 (.0293) -.3850 (.0295)
Real intermediate inputs -.0071 (.0142) -.0047 (.0147) -.0006 (.0145)
Labor (all categories) .1494 (.1491)
Labor category 1b -4.1866 (3.8176)
Labor category 2 .2343 ( .2773)
Labor category 3 .1207 ( .6370)
Labor category 4 .1827 ( .1797)
Owners -28.1480 (17.7654)
Managers -.3637 (3.5978)
High-skilled (production) .2763 (.3115)
Low-skilled (production) .1396 (.2006)
Low-skilled (non-production) .2318 (.5428)
Administration -1.5028 (.8011)
Other services 1.0700 (1.4390)
Sales personnel .1914 (.6691)
Constantc 8.7e+05 (1.4e+05) 8.7e+05 (1.4e+05) 8.5e+05 (1.5e+05)
Size robust subsample 3,645 3,645 3,646
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
41Table 12 – Fixed eﬀects on robust subsample: Firms with 10-1000 workersa
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0588 (.0048) .0537 (.0048) .0374 (.0046)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) -.1083 (.0301) -.1133 (.0300) -.1296 (.0301)
Real intermediate inputs .0188 (.0045) .0376 (.0050) .0246 (.0047)
Labor (all categories) -.0587 (.0310)
Labor category 1b -.2866 (.3576)
Labor category 2 -.1832 (.0446)
Labor category 3 -.2091 (.0949)
Labor category 4 -.0599 (.0256)
Owners -.2707 (.6022)
Managers -.1273 (.4199)
High-skilled (production) -.0671 (.0583)
Low-skilled (production) -.0035 (.0340)
Low-skilled (non-production) -.0212 (.1055)
Administration -.4517 (.1848)
Other services .0957 (.2488)
Sales personnel -.2054 (.1089)
Constantc 13891.64 (4818.77) 16111.7 (4486.62) 14918.70 (5318.08)
Size robust subsample 14,888 14,882 14,867
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
42Table 13 – Implied markups assuming no market power in input markets
Firm size α = 0.9 α = 1.0 α = 1.1
10 to 25 workers .972 1.081 1.189
26 to 100 workers 1.000 1.112 1.223
101 to 1000 workers 1.122 1.246 1.371
10 to 1000 workers 1.018 1.131 1.245
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
4312 Appendix
In this appendix, we extend the relationship between returns to scale α and the markup µ described
in Basu/Fernald (1995) to the case of imperfect input markets.
Assume that ﬁrms are cost minimizers, i.e. they solve the minimization problem
min
K,L,I
r(K)K + w(L)L + q(I)I s.t. Y = f(K,L,I). (21)
The Lagrangian is
L = r(K)K + w(L)L + q(I)I − λ(f(K,L,I) − Y ). (22)
The markup is deﬁned by µ = P/MC (with marginal cost MC). Minimization implies
MC =
























where stars indicate optimal values.





















⇐⇒ µ = α ·
PY





where d = r′(K)K2 + w′(L)L2 + q′(I)I2 ≥ 0.
44Table 14 – Summary Statistics: Firms with 10-25 workers, in thousands of pesos or hours per year (7,312/20,448 observations)
Mean Std.Dev. 10% 25% 50 % 75% 90 % Kurtosis Skewness
Real proﬁt before taxes 101032.0 1.1e+06 -45909.9 -16215.8 2283.65 37126.5 128860.0 584.4 18.0
Real proﬁt 94348.1 1.1e+06 -49626.6 -19353.5 -1098.15 30824.1 117192.0 585.1 18.0
Real capital 244825.0 2.7e+06 5931.9 19548.2 57768.0 154318.0 340110.0 4904.5 64.7
Real intermediate inputs 382911.0 915872.0 57378.5 98479.0 170529.0 322419.0 716328.0 144.8 9.6
Labor (all categories) 39679.7 11992.5 25987 30919 38536 47711 54300 19.7 1.65
Labor category 1 3100.4 2964.5 0 0 2360 4608 6912 17.7 2.1
Labor category 2 14174.2 13738.1 0 4088 9216 22536 34560 5.8 1.3
Labor category 3 3299.8 6116.7 0 0 0 4320 11460 12.7 2.7
Labor category 4 19105.3 14981.1 0 4608 19200 29952 38880 3.6 .5
Owners 1763.9 2340.7 0 0 0 2558 4680 8.0 1.6
Managers 1336.4 2309.4 0 0 0 2304 4419 34.6 3.7
High-skilled (production) 10422.7 13263.5 0 0 4093 18432 30800 5.5 1.4
Low-skilled (production) 16013.5 14462.7 0 0 15333.5 26400 35570 3.2 .6
Low-skilled (non-production) 1996.7 5156.6 0 0 0 2160 6480 40.8 5.0
Administration 3751.5 4356.5 0 0 2400 4992 8640 23.6 3.1
Other services 938.0 2403.2 0 0 0 0 2912 43.7 4.9
Sales personnel 3299.8 6116.77 0 0 0 4320 11460 12.7 2.7
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations. For the deﬁnition of labor categories, see table 1.
4
5Table 15 – Summary Statistics: Firms with 26-100 workers, in thousands of pesos or hours per year (8,446/20,448 observations)
Mean Std.Dev. 10% 25% 50 % 75% 90 % Kurtosis Skewness
Real proﬁt before taxes 465591.0 3.5e+06 -114929.0 -27595.8 32173.6 187526.0 787833.0 1031.4 26.0
Real proﬁt 436108.0 3.4e+06 -127688.0 -36881.3 19511.1 162020 719547 1080.1 26.4
Real capital 1.1e+06 5.0e+06 29778.0 98197.7 297107.0 774899.0 1.8e+06 197.6 12.9
Real intermediate inputs 1.8e+06 1.1e+07 181076.0 318143.0 624617.0 1.5e+06 3.4e+06 1621.5 37.3
Labor (all categories) 116194.0 54379.5 62640 75134 101737 147175 192339 16.9 2.0
Labor category 1 5401.7 5256.0 0 2204 4608 7227 11424 51.9 4.0
Labor category 2 35584.9 38035.3 4912 11014 21600 48384 84693 9.97 2.24
Labor category 3 7214.3 7214.3 0 0 2160 9216 20736 22.6 3.6
Labor category 4 67992.7 67992.7 2496 32975 60240 95616 136710 12.7 1.6
Owners 1885.6 2827.7 0 0 0 3240 5664 7.3 1.8
Managers 3516.1 4906.6 0 0 2297 4858 9036 63.4 4.7
High-skilled (production) 23540.8 35319.1 0 2400 8318 29400 69120 11.9 2.6
Low-skilled (production) 54564.1 47854.0 0 16200 48384 80096 117000 12.8 1.6
Low-skilled (non-production) 8970.6 17570.8 0 0 2304 10800 26064 81.9 5.8
Administration 12044.1 13190.6 1150 4482 8657 15795 25596 31.5 3.8
Other services 3887.6 7766.2 0 0 0 4819 11520 65.4 5.7
Sales personnel 7214.3 13193.8 0 0 2160 9216 20736 22.6 3.6
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations. For the deﬁnition of labor categories, see table 1.
4
6Table 16 – Summary Statistics: Firms with 101-1000 workers, in thousands of pesos or hours per year (4,690/20,448 observations)
Mean Std.Dev. 10% 25% 50 % 75% 90 % Kurtosis Skewness
Real proﬁt before taxes 5.6e+06 2.5e+07 -422569 16999.4 707557 3.4e+06 1.1e+07 1031.4 26.0
Real proﬁt 5.3e+06 2.4e+07 -498854 -17353.9 603560 3.2e+06 1.1e+07 1080.1 26.4
Real capital 1.1e+07 4.3e+07 294121 945209 2.7e+06 7.8e+06 2.0e+07 197.6 12.9
Real intermediate inputs 1.6e+07 5.2e+07 1.0e+06 2.2e+06 5.4e+06 1.3e+07 2.9e+07 1621.5 37.3
Labor (all categories) 623294.0 490349.0 250400 310149 455308 768145 1.2e+06 16.9 2.0
Labor category 1 14752.8 21731.0 0 4050 9216 17470 33607 51.9 4.0
Labor category 2 192855.0 325197.0 24096 46100 99664 216080 432615 9.9 2.2
Labor category 3 30474.8 88838.8 0 0 2260 21168 73815 22.6 3.6
Labor category 4 385211.0 363274.0 66951 168480 277206 479574 827136 12.7 1.6
Owners 1064.5 2712.5 0 0 0 0 4608 7.3 1.8
Managers 13688.3 21426.7 0 2376 7879 16128 32256 63.4 4.7
High-skilled (production) 137743.0 305993.0 6384 15462 43220 138000 347057 11.9 2.6
Low-skilled (production) 296312.0 313026.0 0 98784 211632 374000 673936 12.8 1.6
Low-skilled (non-production) 69482.5 129736.0 0 6900 30066.5 78639 162926 81.9 5.8
Administration 55112.3 71508.7 6238 16891 34944 66816 120692 31.5 3.8
Other services 18702.9 42184.3 0 0 5470 20700 48384 65.4 5.7
Sales personnel 30474.8 88838.8 0 0 2260 21168 73815 22.6 3.6
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations. For the deﬁnition of labor categories, see table 1.
4
7Table 17 – Summary Statistics: Firms with 10-1000 workers, in thousands of pesos or hours per year (total sample, 20,448 observations)
Mean Std.Dev. 10% 25% 50 % 75% 90 % Kurtosis Skewness
Real proﬁt before taxes 1.5e+06 1.2e+07 -102467 -18787 24128.5 265862 2.0e+06 475.5 18.4
Real proﬁt 1.4e+06 1.2e+07 -120367 -25319.2 15129.4 228538 1.8e+06 479.2 18.2
Real capital 3.2e+06 2.1e+07 14767.3 54714.1 231852 1.1e+06 4.5e+06 1674.7 31.0
Real intermediate inputs 4.5e+06 2.7e+07 97333.1 195182 538857 2.2e+06 8.2e+06 876.0 25.4
Labor (all categories) 205143.0 331024.0 31705 45053 84336 207136 517875 86.0 5.3
Labor category 1a 6723.6 11960.4 0 2160 4320 7527 13824 16.6 16.6
Labor category 2 64000.6 173051.0 2708 8640 22362 55200 138240 969.2 19.5
Labor category 3 11149.6 44824.9 0 0 0 8640 22464 246.0 13.0
Labor category 4 123269.0 228754.0 0 17640 44836 122104 312983 27.9 4.3
Owners 1653.7 2656.1 0 0 0 2400 4800 15.1 2.4
Managers 5069.8 11838.6 0 0 2218 5684 11616 688.6 15.3
High-skilled (production) 45043.6 156974.0 0 2304 10122 34024 91632 1394.7 24.3
Low-skilled (production) 96226.6 188922.0 0 8640 33866 93142 243192 30.3 4.5
Low-skilled (non-production) 20356.0 68735.3 0 0 2000 13542 49896 128.8 9.5
Administration 18957.0 40663.9 0 2309 6912 18432 45694 119.1 8.0
Other services 6230.9 21977.9 0 0 0 4608 15000 353.9 14.0
Sales personnel 11149.6 44824.9 0 0 0 8640 22464 246.0 13.0
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations. For the deﬁnition of labor categories, see table 1.
4
8Table 18 – OLS on robust subsample: Firms with 10-25 workersa
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0594 (.0044) .0806 (.0026) .0802 (.0026)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) .1278 (.0500) .1490 (.0500) .1486 (.0500)
Real intermediate inputs .0428 (.0022) .0426 (.0023) .0416 (.0023)
Labor (all categories) -.1103 (.0493)
Labor category 1b -.7464 (.1847)
Labor category 2 -.0499 (.0558)
Labor category 3 -.1431 (.0805)
Labor category 4 -.1125 (.0539)
Owners -1.0856 (.2285)
Managers -.3702 (.2456)
High-skilled (production) -.0360 (.0563)
Low-skilled (production) -.1350 (.0513)
Low-skilled (non-production) -.0161 (.1622)
Administration -.2012 (.1242)
Other services .6027 (.2166)
Sales personnel -.1595 (.0767)
Constantc -8554.00 (2205.86) -9133.43 (2252.83) -8506.14 (2154.45)
Size robust subsample 6,112 6,114 6,113
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
49Table 19 – OLS on robust subsample: Firms with 26-100 workersa
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0651 (.0026) .0652 (.0026) .0650 (.0026)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) -.1368 (.0279) -.1367 (.0279) -.1369 (.0279)
Real intermediate inputs .0516 (.0024) .0517 (.0024) .0525 (.0023)
Labor (all categories) -.2171 (.0368)
Labor category 1b -.4250 (.3378)
Labor category 2 -.2363 (.0552)
Labor category 3 -.3063 (.1261)
Labor category 4 -.1989 (.0393)
Owners -.9863 (.6024)
Managers -.0854 (.3928)
High-skilled (production) -.1978 (.0642)
Low-skilled (production) -.1600 (.0445)
Low-skilled (non-production) -.4082 (.1242)
Administration -.3201 (.1624)
Other services -.3725 (.2516)
Sales personnel -.2656 (.1275)
Constantc 2629.47 (4848.45) 3497.51 (4936.93) 3547.66 (5068.14)
Size robust subsample 6,759 6,759 6,753
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
50Table 20 – OLS on robust subsample: Firms with 101-1000 workersa
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .1094 (.0045) .1084 (.0046) .1036 (.0049)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) -.3583 (.0276) -.3593 (.0276) -.3640 (.0276)
Real intermediate inputs .0882 (.0042) .0882 (.0040) .0986 (.0044)
Labor (all categories) .1303 (.0804)
Labor category 1b -4.937 (2.4052)
Labor category 2 .3600 ( .1615)
Labor category 3 -.5802 ( .3364)
Labor category 4 .1793 ( .1008)
Owners -14.9068 (7.3548)
Managers -1.7233 (2.4516)
High-skilled (production) .3551 (.1796)
Low-skilled (production) .1063 (.1117)
Low-skilled (non-production) .6729 (.3934)
Administration -1.3032 (.7065)
Other services .7319 (1.0783)
Sales personnel -.5335 (.3478)
Constantc 7.9e+04 (6.6e+04) 1.1e+05 (6.0e+04) 1.2e+05 (7.0e+04)
Size robust subsample 3,645 3,645 3,646
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
51Table 21 – OLS on robust subsample: Firms with 10-1000 workersa
Real proﬁt before taxes Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Real capital .0782 (.0016) .0731 (.0018) .0483 (.0012)
Real capital (incl. proﬁts) -.0889 (.0295) -.0940 (.0295) -.1187 (.0294)
Real intermediate inputs .0294 (.0008) .0561 (.0012) .0356 (.0008)
Labor (all categories) -.0956 (.0113)
Labor category 1b -.9479 (.2223)
Labor category 2 -.1804 (.0254)
Labor category 3 -.1833 (.0523)
Labor category 4 -.1370 (.0144)
Owners -.8835 (.3612)
Managers -.1907 (.2679)
High-skilled (production) -.0805 (.0272)
Low-skilled (production) -.0375 (.0166)
Low-skilled (non-production) -.0517 (.0593)
Administration -.1870 (.0926)
Other services -.0607 (.1596)
Sales personnel -.1317 (.0455)
Constantc -5816.49 (2293.52) -6663.40 (2346.48) -1671.00 (2427.88)
Size robust subsample 14,888 14,882 14,867
Source: ENIA, 2001-2006, own computations.
a Bootstrap standard errors accounting for panel structure of the data in parentheses.
b Labor category 1 = Owners, Managers
Labor category 2 = High-skilled (production), Administration
Labor category 3 = Sales personnel
Labor category 4 = Low-skilled (production and non-production), Other services
c Also includes time dummies. Omitting constant and time dummies changes results only marginally.
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